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NOTES
CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING-STATUTES PROVIDING PENALTY AGAINST
THIRu PERSONS" WHO INDucE BR-EACH OF MARXETfNG CONTRACTS.-
Capitalism is most prudent in accepting into its legal system measures
of governmental regulation which apply to economic relations generally
and contract relations particularly. Efforts of the executive, legisla-
tive or judicial branches of either British or American governments
to directly control phases of contractual relationships have generally
met staunch and rigid opposition. The spirit of the sacredness and
inviolability of the contract relation was a logical outgrowth of the
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capitalistic system in its inception. At that time freedom was a
passion, self-sufficiency a goal. From an era thus shrouded and be-
decked with individualism, it is little wonder that measures affect-
ing, even protecting, freedom of contractual relations were slow to
evolve. In 1853 in England malicious interference with a contract
by a third person was definitely recognized as a tort.1 At this time,
however, this form of judicial protection of the contract relation ap-
peared to most businessmen in the United States as an interference
with economic freedom; yet slowly and certainly the tort of malicious
interference with contractual relations has developed in this country.2
Once the judicial branch of the government was able to affect con-
tracts and to protect contractual relations from malicious third-party
influence, public policy determined the boundaries of legal and illegal
interference. Thus we see privileged invasions of contractual relations
growing out of the demands of the public and national welfare. The
most outstanding examples of privileged invasions of contractual re-
lations are the activities in the business world of the labor unions.
Likewise stemming from public policy is the privileged invasion of
contract relations by co-operative marketing associations. The govern-
ment, in answer to public demands, has protected the sale of goods
under co-operative marketing agreements. Some states have made
manifest this spirit of protection by making it a misdemeanor on the
part of a third person to induce or cause the breach of a co-operative
marketing agreement. The plight of the agricultural group in the
United States during the period of rampant industrial progress gave
rise to the present interest of government in the protection of farmers.
It became increasingly apparent that a sound economy demanded a
thriving agricultural group. It was also just as apparent that positive
action was the only effective cure for the utterly dissipated farm
element.
Such governmental aid to the farmers was opposed as an infringe-
ment upon the rights of all citizens to equality under the law. Cries
of loss of freedom rose from the buyers who at the time had practically
reduced the unfortunate farmer to the position of a bargaining slave.
Fundamental rights were being violated when classes such as the
farmer were to be afforded privileges and protection. However the
concept of freedom in society and under government must inevitably
be tempered with a consideration of all other members of the society
or government. Thus the right to buy or sell at will in agricultural
circles is tempered by regulations designed to secure economic stability
1 In Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853), defendant
was held liable by reason of his inducing an opera singer to break her contract
with the plaintiff.
2 Today the great majority of jurisdictions in the United States uphold, the
doctrine of liability on the part of a third person for maliciously interfering with
a contract between two other parties. Prosser on Torts, 978-79 (1941).
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for the farming class.3 Numerous judicial opinions have held that
discrimination in favor of agriculture does not amount to a denial of
the equal protection of the laws to non-agricultural groups of society.
It is understood that the general welfare of these non-agricultural
groups is dependent upon the well-being of the agriculturists.4
In the very nature of things agriculture was at the mercy of pur-
chasers who readily ascertained the advantages of organized buying.
Combinations of purchasing capital virtually regulated the return
which farmers realized on their crops. The wretched condition of the
8 A Colorado court held certain actions of the defendant constituted criminal
inducement to breach a contract whereas other actions of the defendant against
the co-operative were not of such a nature as to fall within the purview of the
statute. In this case the court stated that it was a misdemeanor for a third per-
son to induce a breach of a co-operative marketing agreement. Fort v. People
ex rel. Co-operative Farmers' Exchange, Inc., 81 Col. 420, 256 P. 325 (1927). In
the case of Fort et al. v. Co-operative Farmers' Exchange, Inc., 81 Col. 448, 256
P. 329 (1927) the defendant, Fort, was enjoined from inducing the members of
a marketing association to break their contracts of sale to the co-operative market-
ing association or from interfering in any way with the business of the co-opera-
tive. The Supreme Court of Colorado held defendant guilty of contempt of
the injunction when he continued to induce members to breach their marketing
agreements. However at this time and while this same injunction was in effect,
Fort was responsible for articles appearing in a local newspaper accusing the co-
operative of "cutting" cabbage prices to the detriment of farmer members. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that these acts were not such an interference with
the business of the co-operative as to be considered unlawful. The court -armo-
nized the constitutional right of every citizen to the liberty "to speak, write or
publish whatever he will on any subject" with the public interest of the issue
and decided that the publication would not lawfully interfere with property rights.
However in its opinion the court went on record asserting that under Colorado
statutes "knowingly to induce or to attempt to induce a member of a co-opera-
tive marketing association to break his marketing contract with the association
is a misdemeanor." Fort v. People ex rel. Co-operative Farmers' Exchange, Inc.,
supra.
4 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 45 L. Ed. 102,
21 S. Ct. 43 (1900); Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446, 50 L. Ed. 1099, 26 S. Ct. 671
(1906); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 66 L. Ed. 239,
42 S. Ct. 106 (1921) ; Rifle Potato Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Dexter Smith, 78 Col.
171, 240 P. 937 (1925); Burley Tobacco Co. v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 593,
100 N. E. 89 (1912); Potter v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn., 201
Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923); Brown v. Staple Cotton Co-op. Assn., 132 Miss.
859, 96 So. 849 (1923); State ex inf. Crow v. Continental Tobacco C., 177 Mo.
1, 755 N. W. 737 (1903); Nebraska Wheat Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Norquest, 113
Neb. 731, 204 N. W. 798 (1925); List v. Burley Growers' Co-op. Assn., 114 Ohio
361, 151 N. E. 471 (1926); Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Dunn, 150
Tenn. 614, 266 S. W. 308 (1924); State of Tennessee, ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn., 2 Tenn. App. 674 (1926); Northern Wisconsin
Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936 (1924). Other
examples of legislative discrimination in favor of agriculture are the Clayton Act;
the Capper-Volstead Act (February 18, 1922, chap. 57) 42 Stat. at L. 388, U. S. C.
title 7, sec. 291; and the Co-operative Marketing Act of July 2, 1926, chap. 725)
44 Stat. at L. 802, U. S. C. title 7, sec. 414-1.
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rural populace gained widespread recognition but its needs only in-
creased its helplessness. Efforts to attain the farmer's obvious avenue
of escape - that of combining with other farmers - had not gained
widespread success. It was only through unity that the farmer would
realize equality in bargaining for the sale of his crops. But many fac-
tors hindered successful combination; farms and their occupants were
physically dispersed; the farmer was characteristically an individualistic
person and methods of combined selling had never been effectively
presented to him. Also the rest of the country was in no way prompted
to assist the farmer in his predicament because low food prices through
competitive selling were assured by the agricultural element remain-
ing unorganized.
To relieve this unhealthy national economic situation both the state
and federal governments effected statutes providing for co-operative
marketing agreements - one phase of which is special protection in
contract relations between the co-operative and its members. The over-
all purpose of these statutes is usually set out in the introduction to
the co-operative marketing act of each jurisdiction.5
It is well settled that the very existence of the co-operative de-
pends upon the enforcement of its mutual contracts of purchase and
resale - exclusive purchase from the members and exclusive resale
to the buyer through the co-operative. If this "exclusiveness" in co-
operative activity were not insisted upon, the effectiveness of the or-
ganization would be seriously hampered if not totally destroyed. There
would be no easier method of destroying the co-operative than to in-
terfere with the exclusiveness of flow of products from the member
producer through the co-operative to the final purchaser. The cp-
operative can only insure a just return to the farmer for his products
when it is the exclusive or, at least, the predominating bargaining
5 Indiana Statutes Annotated (Burns, 1933) § 15-1601, "Declaration of Policy.
(a) In order to promote, foster and encourage the intelligent and orderly pro-
duction and marketing of agricultural products through cooperation; and to elimi-
mate speculation and waste; and to make the distribution of agricultural products
between producer and consumer as direct as can be efficiently done; to stabilize
the marketing of agricultural products, and to provide for the organization and
incorporation of agricultural cooperative associations and societies, this act is
passed.
(b) It is here recognized that agriculture is characterized by individual pro-
duction in contrast to the group or factory system that characterized other forms
of industrial production, and that the ordinary form of corporate organization
permits industrial groups to combine for the purpose of group production and the
ensuing group marketing and that the public has an interest in permitting
farmers to bring their industry to the high degree of efficiency and merchandis-
ing skill evidenced in the marketing industries; and that the public interest de-
mands that the farmer be encouraged to attain a superior and more direct system
of marketing in the substitution of merchandising for the blind, unscientific and
speculative selling of crops. (Acts 1925, ch. 20, sec. I p. 42; 1931, ch. 34, sec.
1, p. 79)."
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agent in the area for the products. Extensive competition would
cause the complete dissolution of the co-operative and a return to the
former open market competition where a single farmer sold to the or-
ganized purchaser. For this reason co-operative marketing statutes
have provided penalties for members who breach their co-operative
marketing agreements. But more important are the stringent penalties
which are provided for those third persons who induce the member to
breach his co-operative marketing contract. Recognizing the serious
danger of possible destruction of the co-operative by third party inter-
ference in the co-operative marketing contract, legislatures have, in
some cases, made it a misdemeanor on the part of the third person
who induces the member to breach his marketing contract. 6 Many
other states provide for heavy penalties to be assessed in a civil suit
in favor of the co-operative against the third persons who bring about
a breach of marketing agreement.
7
The basic defense of a third person guilty of inducing a breach of
a co-operative marketing contract has been the plea of the unconsti-
tutionality of the statute which classifies such a breach as blameworthy.
It is claimed that a statute condemning a third person for buying pro-
ducts impairs the freedom of contractual relations. Also equal protec-
tion under the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution is pointed to as being violated by such penalty statutes.
This same Constitutional Amendment affords to those guilty of induc-
ing a breach the possible argument that the statute takes property
from them without due process of law. Overshadowing all these de-
fenses is the plea that the legislature has no power to make the in-
fluencing of a member to breach a co-operative marketing contract a
crime.
6 The following states have statutes which render a third person guilty of a
misdemeanor if he knowingly induces a member to breach a co-operative market-
ing agreement; Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and
Vermont. A typical co-operative marketing agreement penalty statute is that of
Kentucky which also makes it a crime to induce a member to breach his market-
ing contract. Kentucky Statutes Annotated (Baldwin, 1943) § 272.990 "Penalties:
(2) Any individual or any corporation whose officers or employees knowingly
induce or attempt to induce any member to break his marketing contract with
an association or who maliciously and knowingly spreads false reports about the
finances or management of any association shall be fined not less then one hundred
dollars nor more than one thousand dollars for each offense, and shall be -liable
to the association aggrieved in a civil suit in the penal sum of five hundred dollars,
for each offense."
7 The following states have statutes which provide for the recovery of a
penalty in favor of the co-operative from a third person who induces a member
to breach his co-operative marketing contract. These states do not make this
action a misdemeanor, however. They are: California, Florida, Georgia, Ilindis,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland; Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Tennessee and Virginia. Texas pro-
vides for treble damages to go to the co-operative.
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These contentions are rebutted in the majority of the courts by
reference to the police power of the legislature to secure the general
welfare of the community. The courts point out the dilemma in which
the farm element existed prior to governmental aid. The legislative
intent obviously was to remove the obstacles which stood in the path
of clarification of this agricultural dilemma. It has been shown that
penalty statutes prohibiting third persons from inducing members to
breach their co-operative marketing contracts are essential to the
potency of the acts as corrective measures. Thus the co-operative
marketing acts are established as necessary tools to the maintenance
of the general welfare, and the penalty statutes are considered as
essential to the effective existence of the acts.
In an outstanding federal case involving this controversy the Su-
preme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of a
typical marketing agreement penalty statute by a unanimous decision
in 1928.8 The defendant warehouse company purchased tobacco from
a producer, who, as a member of the plaintiff co-operative, had pledged
the sale of his full crop to the co-operative. The warehouse, at the
time of the purchase, was fully aware of the producer's co-operative
marketing agreement with the plaintiff. Mr. Justice McReynolds de-
livered the opinion of the undivided court in finding the warehouse
guilty of inducing a breach of a co-operative marketing contract.
The defendants challenged the validity of the criminal penalty
statute as offending the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
and thus depriving them of equal protection of the laws. The court
rebutted this contention by stating:
"The statute penalizes all who wittingly solicit, persuade, or
induce an association member to break his marketing contract. It
8 Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative
Marketing Association, 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928). Tigner
v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 84 L. Ed. 1124, 60 S. Ct. 881 (1940) pointed out that
the principal case was an outstanding example of the attitude of the judiciary
toward the legislative policy of aid to agriculture. In further support of the
principal case is In re Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 35 F. S. 787 (1940) in
which the court held that co-operative associations for the marketing of agricultural
products have a favored status under federal laws and the laws of Wisconsin, and
that, therefore, a co-operative thus organized was not to be amenable to ad-
judication as an involuntary bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act. Compare with
Shuster et al. v. Ohio Farmers' Co-operative Milk Association, 61 F. (2d) 339
(1932) which affirmed the validity of the Liberty Warehouse case but found co-
operative marketing associations amenable to the Bankruptcy Act. The court
stated that the Liberty Warehouse case served to illuminate brilliantly the active
existence of co-operative marketing in economic fields and that with their ex-
istence thus apparent to Congress, it was the place of the legislative body to
specifically exclude the co-operatives from the Bankruptcy Act. For a discussion
of the principal case see (1929) Tenn. L. Rev. 7:123-7F and (1929) Texas L.
Rev. 7:306-7F. Also the same problem is discussed in Note (1928) Harvard L
Rev. 41:668-9.
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does not prescribe more rigorous penalties for warehousemen than
for other offenders. Nobody is permitted to do what is denied to
warehousemen. There is no substantial basis upon which to in-
voke the equal protection clause." (Italics ours)
The defendants placed much reliance on the Connolly case of 1902,
in which the United States Supreme Court decided that particular ex-
emption of argricultural interests was a denial of the equal protection
of the law. The Connolly case had little value in the solution of the
present case, the Court held, as it distinguished the Connolly case from
the instant proceedings on factual grounds.9
The Supreme Court concluded its statement in support of validity
of the statute by expressing the now generally accepted policy regard-
ing co-operative marketing statutes:
"Co-operative marketing statutes promote the common interest.
The provisions for protecting the fundamental contracts against
interference by outsiders are essential to the plan. This court
has recognized as permissible some discrimination intended to en-
courage agriculture. And in many cases it has affirmed the general
power of the states so to legislate as to meet a definitely threatened
evil. Viewing all the circumstances, it is impossible for us to say
that the legislature of Kentucky could not treat marketing con-
tracts between association and its members as of a separate class,
provide against probable interference therewith, and to that ex-
tent limit the sometime action of warehousemen.
"The liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution is free-
dom from arbitrary restraint - not immunity from reasonable
regulation to safeguard the public interest. The question is whether
the restrictions of a statute have reasonable relation to a proper
purpose." 10 (Italics ours)
9 Later, also the case of Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 46
L. Ed. 679, 22 S. Ct. 431 (1902) was overruled in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S.
141, 84 L. Ed. 1124, 60 S. Ct. 881 (1940) cited supra note 8. There Mr. Justice
Frankfurter delivered the eight to one majority opinion and in part stated: "And
so we conclude that to write into law the differences between agriculture and other
economic pursuits was within the power of the Texas legislature. Connolly's case
has been worn away by the erosion of time, and we are of opinion that it is no
longer controlling." The Court pointed out that an impressive legislative move-
ment during the forty years following the Connolly case was witness to the general
acceptance of the view that the differences between agriculture and industry call
for differentiation in the formulation of public policy.
10 The view of the principial case finds virtually universal judicial support.
Warren v. Alabama Farm Bureau Cotton Assn., 213 Ala. 61, 104 So. 264 (1925),
where the court was of the opinion that co-operatives were in no way injurious
to the public interest or in any way violative of public policy. In Arkansas Cot-
ton Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Brown, 128 Ark. 504, 270 S. W. 946, 1119 (1925)
the court sustained a Co-operative Marketing Act: "The statute seems to be in a
form which has become standard and has been enacted in many of the states, the
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Kentucky was one of the earliest states whose supreme court was
called upon to uphold the constitutionality of a co-operative market-
ing statute which made it a misdemeanor to induce a member to breach
a marketing contract. In 1910 the court decided that, unless such a
statute were expressly or impliedly forbidden by the terms of the
state or federal constitutions, it is valid. Since co-operative market-
ing pools are lawful, the passage of statutes necessary for the protec-
tion of those pools is within the police power of the legislature, the
court said. Likewise co-operative marketing penalty statutes are not
an interference with one's right to acquire property because a person
has no right to acquire property from those who have no right to sell
that property. The Kentucky Supreme Court also announced that
the legislature, for purposes of public welfare, may set out the farm
element as a group to be protected, and that as long as all persons
who violate the terms of a protection statute are guilty, there is no
denial of equal protection of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
enactment of such legislation being manifestly prompted by the universal urge to
promote prosperity in agricultural pursuits." The court in Manchester Dairy
System v. Hayward, 82 N. H. 193, 132 Atl. 12 (1926) held a co-operative
marketing contract in accord with public policy. "Co-operative marketing agree-
ments, containing the essential features of the contract here considered, have
been recognized in many of our states as a legitimate means of protecting its
members against oppression, of avoiding the waste incident to the dumping of
produce upon the market with the consequent wide fluctuations in prices and of
securing to the producer a larger share of the price paid by the consumer for his
products." In accord are Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn. v. Jones, 185 N. C. 265,
117 S. E. 174 (1923); Northern Wisconsin Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182
Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936 (1924); Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Amsn. v. Dunn,
150 Tenn. 614, 266 S. W. 308 (1924); Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Assn. v.
Danville Warehouse Co., Inc., 144 Va. 456, 132 S. E. 482 (1926); Burley Tobacco
Society v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 583, 100 N. E., 89 (1912); Bullville Milk Pro-
ducers' Assn., Inc. v. Armstrong, 178 N. Y. S. 612 (1919); Anaheim Citrus Fruit
Assn. v. Yoeman, 51 Cal. App. 759, 197 P. 959 (1921); Washington Cranberry
Growers' Assn. v. Moore, 117 Wash. 430, 201 P. 773, 204 P. 811 (1922). Contra,
Minnesota Wheat Growers' Co-op. Marketing Assn. v. Rahke, 163 Minn. 403, 204
N. W. 314 (1925), where the court held that a statute prohibiting third parties
from buying or handling products merely because they were under contract to be
sold to a co-operative marketing association is an infringement of the liberty of
contract guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. This court held the
statute to be unconstitutional. This view apparently stands alone in American
judicial decisions.
11 Commonwealth v. Hodges et al., 137 Ky. 233, 125 S. W. 689 (1910).
Other decisions which recognize the principal case as valid authority are: Burley
Tobacco Society v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 583, 100 N. E. 89 (1912); Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Burley Tobacco Society et al., 147 Ky. 22, 143 S. W. 1040 (1912);
Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Market-
ing Association, 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928); Potter v. Dark
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Assn., 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923); Lee et al. v.
Clearwater Growers Assn. et al., 93 Fla. 214, 111 So. 722 (1927); Tobacco Growers'
Co-op. Assn. v. Jones, 185 N. C. 265, 117 S. E. 174 (1923) and Elephant Butte
Alfalfa Assn. v. Rouault, 33 N. M. 136, 262 P. 185 (1928).
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Co-operative marketing statutes have been enacted in virtually every
state of the Union, and an examination of the cases shows that uni-
versal judicial acceptance has greeted legislative efforts to aid the
plight of the farmer by these co-operative marketing agreements.
12
Likewise virtually universal judicial acceptance has greeted those
penalty statutes which safeguard the existence of co-operative market-
ing contracts. The strongest of these penalty statutes are those which
make it a misdemeanor for a third person to induce a breach of such a
contract. These are forcefully indicative of the genuine wholehearted
assistance government is bringing to argricultural groups in this
country.
A most controversial economic question of the present day - how
much personal freedom must be forfeited to the government to es-tablish an economic system which affords security to all - finds one
answer in the principles of co-operative organizations.
In a democratic system 6f government where the majority of the
citizens exercise control of the policies of the government, it is in-
evitable that this majority be constantly pressing for governmental
reforms aimed at the minority which possesses the means of production.
Thus we see economists offering solutions to the problem of economic
security for the political majority.
Since the collectivist state, placing the means of production in the
hands of the government, is comparatively easy to attain, this method
of attaining majority economic security seems to receive the most ac-
tive and effective support.
However it has been said that a form of economy based on the prin-
ciple of the co-operative organization also would bring economic security
to the majority of the citizens. This system is known as the distribu-
tive state wherein the mass of citizens own the means of production.
Such a system, however, is not so easily attained. It places on each
citizen the burden of control and decision in relation to his private
property - his share in the means of production. Property, of course,
is private and for this reason alone many advocates have been found
to support the distributive modification of capitalistic government. For
this reason, also, an expanding future has been predicted for the co-
operative marketing association.
Thomas Broden.
12 Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative
Marketing Association, 276 U. S. 71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 S. Ct. 291 (1928).
